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The authors of this Comment contend that the communications
problems of non-English-speaking indigent defendants can best be
solved by the appointment of court-compensated interpreters. Al-
though they evaluate recent legislative proposals directed at these
problems, the authors stress the arguments derived from considerations
of equal protection and due process which support a possible consti-
tutional right to interpreters.
Since language is the principal medium of communication in all
legal proceedings, the ability to understand the language used in them
is critical to the fairness of those proceedings.' Language problems
have not often been recognized as a threat to the fair administration
of justice.2  But to a sizeable minority of the people of the United
States' the inability to speak and understand English well has become
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1. For example, a question misunderstood by a defendant-witness "may bring
forth an answer that might turn the scales from innocence to guilt or from guilt to inno-
cence. Then too, the answer given might be made in words not entirely familiar or un-
derstood by the defendant." State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 450, 121 P.2d 903, 905
(1942).
2. Increasingly, however, commentators as well as courts are recognizing the
problems faced by the non-English-speaking defendant. The authors found two articles
particularly useful: Morris, The Sixth Amendment's Right of Confrontation and the
Non-English Speaking Accused, 41 FLA. B.J. 475 (1967); Comment, The Right to an
Interpreter, 25 RuTGERs L. Rav. 145 (1970-71). For discussions of recent cases on
the right to an interpreter, see Note, Criminal Lav: Right to Interpreter is Waived
Where Defendant or Counsel Fail to Act Overtly to Inform Court of Defendant's In-
ability to Understand English, 37 BRoOKLYN L. REV. 201 (1970-71); Note, Constitu-
tional Law: Translators: Mandatory for Due Process, 2 CoNtr. L. Rnv. 163 (1969);
Note, Criminal Law: Confrontation-Right to Translator, 46 ST. JoRNs L. Rv. 469
(1972); Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 276 (1971).
3. Census statistics indicate that as many as 22.1 million persons in the United
States have poor English language skills. This figure represents the total of foreign-born
persons claiming a non-English first language (7.9 million persons) and native-born of
foreign or mixed parentage (14.2 million persons). Comment, "Citado A Comparecer":
Language Barriers and Due Process-Is Mailed Notice in English Constitutionally Suf-
ficient?, 61 CALn. L. Rav. 1395, 1399 & n.41 (1973), citing Mother Tongue of the
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a source of frustration and injustice.4
One way of alleviating some of the frustration and injustice felt
by those who do not speak and understand English is the use of inter-
preters in criminal trials. Interpreters may play three different roles
in criminal proceedings: (1) They make the questioning of a non-
English-speaking witness possible; (2) they facilitate the non-English-
speaking defendant's understanding of the colloquy between the attor-
neys, the witness, and the judge; and (3) they enable the non-English-
speaking defendant and his English-speaking attorney to communicate.
In this Comment an interpreter performing the first service will be
called a "witness interpreter," one performing the second service, a
"proceedings interpreter," and one performing the third service, a "de-
fense intepreter."
Most courts have been reluctant to provide interpreters for de-
fendants. Some have held that failure to request an interpreter consti-
tutes waiver of the right.5 Others have denied interpreters after a per-
functory examination of the defendant's English showed only a minimal
ability to understand the proceedings. 6 Longtime citizens are often
Population by Nativity, Parentage, and Race: 1970, in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES SUMMARY, DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS, PC-(1)-
DI 599, table 193 (1973).
Inability to speak English is especially common in low-income, ethnic neighbor-
hoods. One report, for example, indicates that the inability to communicate in English
is most common in poor Mexican-American neighborhoods. L. GREBLER, J. MOORE &
R. GUZMAN, THE MEXICAN AMERICAN PEOPLE 84, Table 18-1 (1970).
4. For an excellent description of the language-related problems faced by non-
English-speaking Mexican Americans see U.S. COMM'N ON CivIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN
AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTWES'" (1970). The
Commission found that:
Interpreters are not readily available in many Southwestern courtrooms;
(a) when interpreters were made available, they are often untrained and un-
qualified; (b) in the higher courts, where qualified interpreters were more read-
ily available, there has been criticism of the standards of their selection and
training and skills.
Id. at 89. The report described the indifference of judges to problems faced by non-
English-speaking Mexican American defendants:
Many lawyers stated that the language problem puts some Mexican Ameri-
cans to significant disadvantage in criminal cases. Courts often assume that
a defendant who can "get along" in English can understand the charges against
him and the proceedings in court. A number of people stated that many judges
in the Southwest do not realize the extent of language limitation among Mexi-
can Americans and are unaware of the extent to which it interferes with their
ability to defend themselves.
Id. at 69.
5. See cases cited at note 110 infra.
6. See People v. Annett, 251 Cal. App. 2d 858, 59 Cal. Rptr. 888 (2d Dist.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968) (monosyllabic "yes" responses to 11 questions
demonstrated a sufficient ability to speak and understand English); In re Muraviov, 192
Cal. App. 2d 604, 13 Cal. Rptr. 466 (2d Dist. 1961) (per curiam) ("yes" and "no"
to four questions sufficient); People v. Ayala, 89 Il1. App. 2d 393, 233 N.E.2d 80 (1st
Dist. 1967) (interpreter denied on basis of defendant's testimony at trial). See also
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presumed to understand English despite some indication to the con-
trary.7 Furthermore, appellate courts have almost invariably rejected
claims of language incompetency either by deferring to the trial court
or by finding sufficient understanding of English after examining the
trial transcript.8
When interpreters have been appointed, their functions have been
defined narrowly. Although many courts have statutory authority to
appoint an interpreter for witnesses, including the defendant if he testi-
fies,9 the statutes consider neither proceedings nor defense interpre-
ters. A few courts have granted the non-English-speaking indigent
defendant a court-appointed and court-compensated proceedings inter-
preter, 10 but a possible right to a defense interpreter to translate the
Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86 (1907); Saurez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1962); People v. Lopez, 21 Cal. App. 188, 131 P. 104 (2d Dist. 1913).
7. E.g., Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1962) (30 years); Gon-
zalez v. People, 109 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1940) (eight years); State v. Karumai, 101 Utah
592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942) (20 years).
8. Compare United States v. Barrios, 457 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Sosa, 379 F.2d 525 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967); Cervantes
v. Cox, 350 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1965); Gonzalez v. People, 109 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.
1940), with In re Muraviov, 192 Cal. App. 2d 604, 13 Cal. Rptr. 466 (2d Dist. 1961)
(per curiam).
9. Twenty-four states make some provision for the appointment of interpreters:
Alabama, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico
(constitutional provision), North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Wyoming, and Wisconsin. Most state statutes empower the courts to appoint an inter-
preter whenever the judge believes one necessary; but they typically provide only for the
appointment of an interpreter to aid a witness's testimony. Michigan, Wisconsin, New
Jersey, and New Mexico, however, permit the appointment of an interpreter any time
the defendant does not comprehend the proceeding. For example, Michigan's statute
provides:
If any person is accused of any crime or misdemeanor and is about to be exam-
ined or tried before any justice of the peace, magistrate or judge of a court
of record and it appears to the . . .judge that such a person is incapable of
adequately understanding the charge or presenting his defense thereto because
of lack of ability to understand or speak the English language . . . the . . .
judge shall appoint a qualified person to act as an interpreter.
MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 775.192 (emphasis added).
Article 2, section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and de-
fend himself in person, and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have the charge
and testimony interpreted to him in language that he understands. ...
N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 14 (emphasis added). But cf. People v. Lopez, 21 Cal. App.
188, 190, 131 P. 104, 105 (1913) (court required to appoint an interpreter in those cases
only where the witness does not understand or speak the English language), citing CAL.
EVID. CODE § 752(a) (1965).
10. See State v. Natividad, - Ariz. -, 526 P.2d 730 (1974). In Natividad the
non-English-speaking indigent defendant was not informed of his right to an interpreter
during interrogation (although the interrogation was conducted in Spanish, his native
language). No interpreters were provided at the preliminary hearing, and none was
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discussi6ns between the defendant and his attorney prior to and during
trial has been ignored."
Focusing on the functions of proceedings interpreters and defense
interpreters, we will argue that the requirements of equal protection
and due process mandate a constitutional right to interpreters perform-
ing these tasks for non-English-speaking defendants. In addition, we
will consider the adequacy of recent statutory responses to the problem
of the non-English-speaking defendant. Finally, we will discuss the
often unrecognized importance of the defense interpreter and the
possible alternative of the bilingual attorney.
I
EQUAL PROTECTION AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 12
A state violates the equal protection clause when it creates invidi-
ous classifications.' 3 Governmental action inevitably results in unequal
burdens or benefits,' so an equal protection claim must demonstrate
that the effects of a particular classification fall with unjustifiable harsh-
ness on similarly situated groups. 5 The standard for determining the
available during either pre-trial proceedings or attorney-client conferences. The court
likened the defendant's position to that of a person forced to observe the proceedings
from a soundproof booth in the back of the courtroom, and remanded the case to the
trial court for a determination of the defendant's ability to speak English.
11. E.g., United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 902 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S.
244 (1968) (no absolute right to interpreter); Cervantes v. Cox, 350 F.2d 855 (10th
Cir. 1965) (same); Viliborghi v. State, 45 Ariz. 275, 283, 43 P.2d 210, 214 (1935)
(same).
12. The frustrations suffered by non-English-speaking defendants are part of a
larger problem of discrimination against linguistic minorities in the United States.
Equal protection arguments have been used, with mixed success, as a basis for striking
down discrimination based on language. Compare Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466
P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970) (the California Supreme Court struck down as a vio-
lation of equal protection a state constitutional provision conditioning the right to vote
upon ability to speak English); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires school districts to provide English language training
programs for non-English-speaking school children); Serna v. Portales Municipal School
Dist., 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974) (same), with Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d
738 (9th Cir. 1973) (welfare recipients who spoke only Spanish argued unsuccessfully
that welfare termination notices must be printed in Spanish); and Guerrero v. Carlson,
9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137
(1974) (persons who spoke only Spanish not denied due process of law where state did
not provide Spanish-speaking interviewers, notices in Spanish and other communications
in Spanish regarding claims for unemployment insurance).
13. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 353-65 [hereinafter cited as Tussman & tenBroek].
14. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 13, at 343; Developments in
in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HAIv. L. REv. 1065, 1076 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Equal Protection].
15. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 13, at 344.
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legitimacy of a given classification varies; it becomes stricter when the
classifying principle is membership in certain groups which have been
historically discriminated against'6 or when the classification is framed
so that it infringes upon rights which have been recognized to be funda-
mental. 17  The remainder of this section examines the applicability of
the equal protection analysis to language-based discrimination resulting
from rules requiring court proceedings to be conducted in English, and
then considers whether a state's failure to supply an interpreter to a
non-English-speaking indigent defendant violates any of the recognized
tests of equal protection.
A. Discriminatory State Action
When a non-English-speaking indigent defendant is denied an in-
terpreter it would seem undeniable that discriminatory state action
exists.' The state requires that English be used in its courts, thus
placing a burden on those unable to speak English, and then institutes
a criminal prosecution, which further subjects non-English-speaking
persons to the burden of the rule. Nevertheless, states continue to ar-
gue that de facto discrimination is too tenuous a thread by which to
link the state to the harm. For example, in Lau v. Nichols a a school
district contended that discrimination against Chinese-speaking stu-
dents in classes taught in English "is not the result of laws enacted by
the state presently or historically, but the result of deficiencies created
by the applicants themselves in failing to learn the English language." 20
What the school district failed to realize, however, is that state action
is not abrogated merely because the characteristic according to which
the classification is drawn, language disability, is remediable by the vic-
tim of the discrimination.2' Indeed, state action can be present when
unequals like English-speaking and non-English-speaking indigent de-
fendants, are treated the same. As Justice Frankfurter said in Dennis
16. See note 27 infra.
17. See note 28 infra.
18. Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970). See
generally Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORNELL L. R!v. 375 (1958); Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term,
Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv.
L. Rpay. 69 (1967); Note, The Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal
Equal Opportunity, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 943, 972-73 (1974).
19. 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
20. 483 F.2d at 799.
21. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969) (out of state residency); Grif-
fin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (poverty of criminal defendant); Sei Fujii v. State,
38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (alienage). While language disability may be
remediable, once a defendant is arrested he has little time to learn English without sacri-
ficing his right to a speedy trial.
19751
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v. United States, "[Tihere is no greater inequality than the equal treat-
ment of unequals. '2 -
B. Applicable Standards of Review
Assuming the existence of state action and discriminatory classifi-
cation, the court must decide what standard to apply in reviewing the
permissibility of the classification. There are three recognized stand-
ards of review: (1) the reasonableness test; (2) the strict scrutiny test;
and (3) the intensified means scrutiny test.23
1. Reasonableness
The Warren Court adhered rather closely to a two-tiered model
of equal protection, 24 one level of which was the reasonableness test.
In applying -the reasonableness or "rational relationship" test, the Court
upheld a classification if any conceivable state interest could support
such a rule,25 which made it possible for the Court to speculate as to
what rational interests could support the classification.
If the courts choose -to apply the reasonableness test to the ques-
tion of interpreters for non-English-speaking defendants, the state can
always advance sufficient interests to justify denial of an interpreter.
For example, requiring that interpreters be furnished might result in
suspension of the proceedings until a defendant's language disability
is determined and interpreters are secured. When the defendant only
understands a rare language, and the trial is held in an area where mul-
tilingual experts may be few, the delay could be lengthy and costly.
In addition, the use of English in court proceedings may encourage the
learning of English, which would arguably facilitate commerce and re-
sult in a more aware and knowledgeable citizenry.
2. Strict Scrutiny
The other level of the equal protection model used by the Warren
Court was strict scrutiny.26 Under this test, when lines are drawn
which impose a burden upon a group distinguished by a suspect classifi-
22. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing).
23. For a description of the reasonableness test and the strict scrutiny test see
Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1077-1132. For a discussion of the new "intensified
means scrutiny" test see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changizg Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
24. Gunther, supra note 23, at 8.
25. Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1083.
26. Gunther, supra note 23, at 8.
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cation,2 7 or which touch upon fundamental interests,28 the state must
justify the classifications by showing that they are necessary in order
to further compelling interests. 29  The interests advanced by the states
have seldom been found to warrant the harm done.30
Denial of an interpreter to a non-English-speaking defendant
arguably involves both an infringement of fundamental rights and a use
of a suspect classification, thus requiring the application of the strict
scrutiny test. The alleged discrimination infringes on non-English-
speaking indigent defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel,3 ' while
the comunication barrier between the defendant and his counsel severely
restricts the defendant's right to confrontation. 2  Both the right to
27. Certain classifications which have historically been the targets of discrimina-
tion are suspect. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national origin); see Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1088.
28. The number of interests deemed fundamental has remained modest. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (right to make personal decision relating to procreation); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(rights of criminal defendants); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procrea-
tion). Plausible candidates for the status have been rejected. E.g., San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1972) (education not fundamental inter-
est); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing not fundamental interest). See
also Gunther, supra note 23, at 13. According to Professor Gunther the Court is un-
likely to expand the number of fundamental interests in the future. Id. at 24. Indeed,
attempts to expand the number of fundamental interests might backfire. Id. at 10.
29. E.g., Sugarman & Widess, Equal Protection for Non-English-Speaking School
Children: Lau v. Nichols, 62 CAuiF. L. REv. 157, 163 (1974) (citations omitted):
Since 1954, at least, the United States Supreme Court has taken the position
that when the state rule is explicitly based upon race, as when it treats Blacks
and whites differently by assigning them to separate schools, or when a candi-
date's race is made to appear on the ballot, or when a special hurdle-voter
rather than just legislative approval-is placed in front of open-occupancy or-
dinances, then the rule is to be strictly scrutinized by the judiciary. The Court
seems to have concluded that since our experience indicates that rules dealing
with race often serve invidious racial purposes, and different treatment of
Blacks usually means inferior treatment, the state must justify its action with
a showing that it is necessary to the furtherance of a compelling state interest.
See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
30. Id., at 163. But see Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
31. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); notes 97-103 in-
fra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text.
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confrontation a3 and the right to counsel 4 have been identified as funda-
mental rights under the due process clause, and rights fundamental to
due process are also fundamental to an equal protection analysis. 85
The rules requiring that court proceedings be in English, and
withholding a right to a defense interpreter, also discriminate by creat-
ing a suspect classification. 6 Language, like physiological characteris-
tics, is closely related to national origin.37 Since English is the national
language of the United States, probably all those who do not speak
English were either foreign-born or were born in the United States to
foreign-born parents. 3s
The Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols39 may validate
the link between language discrimination and national origin discrimi-
nation. While the decision is based on section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and guidelines promulgated thereunder, the Court upheld
a finding that national origin or race discrimination existed when
Chinese-speaking children were forced to attend classes taught only in
English.40 Since the purpose of section 601 is to implement the four-
teenth amendment's prohibition against discrimination because of race
or national origin,41 language discrimination which constitutes national
origin discrimination under section 601 should also constitute national
origin discrimination under the equal protection clause.42
33. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 56 (1898) (United States Constitution
deems the right of confrontation essential for the protection of life and liberty).
34. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
35. Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1130.
36. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreward: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 7, 20 (1969).
37. Non-English-speaking indigent defendants are also discriminated against on
the basis of wealth, since the rules requiring court proceedings to be conducted in Eng-
lish only hurt those non-English-speaking defendants who cannot afford to hire an in-
terpreter. Despite strong dicta in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956), wealth
has not been held to be a suspect classification. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 15-29 (1973); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966). Nevertheless the Court has been zealous in striking down wealth-related
barriers to such fundamental rights as voting or criminal appeals. Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (criminal appeals); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (same). See also
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel).
38. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 13, Lan v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
39. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
40. Id. at 567-68.
41. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
42. The Court in Lau may have simply deferred to the determination of Congress,
or to an executive agency acting pursuant to congressional authorization, that regulation
of language discrimination is necessary to enforce the fourteenth amendment. If so, the
Court may not find the relationship between language and national origin to be so com-
pelling as to equate the two in areas in which Congress has not determined that regula-
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When a challenged practice or statute is founded on a suspect clas-
sification and impinges upon a fundamental interest, the United States
Supreme Court usually applies the strict scrutiny standard.43 The
Court's avoidance of equal protection analysis in Lau v. Nichols,44 how-
ever, creates uncertainty as to how language discrimination cases will
be analyzed.45 The equal protection argument for the non-English-
speaking indigent defendant, however, is stronger than that of the peti-
tioners in Lau who were denied equal access to education. The
effective assistance of counsel, 46 unlike education,4" is a fundamental
interest for equal protection purposes.
Moreover, it is not necessarily true that discrimination resulting
from inaction or "thoughtlessness" causes less damage than action re-
suiting from invidious intent. As Professor Black stated:
Inaction, rather obviously, is the classic and the most efficient
way of "denying equal protection;" the denial of justice, "in inter-
national law, includes the failure to act." When a racial minority
is struggling to escape drowning in the isolation and squalor of slum
ghetto residence, everywhere across the country, I do not see why
the refusal to throw a life-preserver does not amount to a denial of
protection. 48
Few state interests are compelling enough to meet the strict scrutiny
tion of language discrimination is necessary. In addition, section 601, as construed by
HEW, may represent an exercise of Congress' power over interstate commerce.
Furthermore, teaching English to linguistically deprived children increases the abil-
ity of such children to become fully functioning participants in the economy. Thus, Lau
may also be construed as upholding a congressional allocation of federal disbursements
unrelated to equal protection.
43. See Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1088.
44. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
45. Sugarman and Widess suggest that the avoidance of equal protection analysis
in Lau and similar cases may be due to concern that a "plausible non-invidious explana-
tion" exists. Sugarman & Widess, supra note 29. However, not only is there some evi-
dence that language statutes were passed to exclude foreigners in Castro v. State, 2 Cal.
3d 223, 230-31, 466 P.2d 244, 248-49, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 24-25 nn.11-14 (1970), but
courts have held that "the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and
unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme."
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
801 (1968); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevel. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir.
1968). Another factor which may have influenced the Court in Lau was the large
number of linguistically disadvantaged students in the school system. See 414 U.S. at
572 (Burger, CJ., concurring). The court of appeals in Serna v. Portales Municipal
Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974), indicated that it would not order remedial ac-
tion if only a few students were linquistically deprived. Id. at 1154. Thus, the Court
may require courts to provide remedial aid only when non-English-speaking persons
comprise a large percentage of the population of the. judicial district.
46. See note 34 supra and text accompanying note 99 infra.
47. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973).
48. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 73 (1967).
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standard;49 certainly none exist to justify language discrimination
against indigent defendants. Neither the state's interest in maintaining
a single national language, 50 nor its interest in the economy and effi-
ciency of court proceedings51 is sufficiently compelling to justify dis-
crimination against those who have not conformed to the dominant lan-
guage.52
3. Intensified Means Scrutiny
Even if the Supreme Court determines that the strict scrutiny test
is inapplicable to the denial of an interpreter to non-English-speaking
indigent defendants, it may find that the denial violates constitutional
standards of equal protection. 3 Under the intensified means scrutiny
envisioned by Professor Gunther as an emerging standard for equal
protection review,5 4 the Court would avoid substantive judgments on
the validity of legislative ends and focus on whether the means selected
to achieve the objectives were reasonable. 5
Although the state might claim that its interest in promoting the
learning and use of English would be advanced by denying the exis-
tence of any right of non-English-speaking indigent defendants to an
interpreter, it can hardly be argued that possible conviction and impri-
sonment is an appropriate sanction for failure to learn English.
Furthermore, rules requiring court proceedings to be conducted in
English probably do little to encourage the learning of English. Af-
fluent non-English-speaking persons can simply hire their own inter-
preters, while few non-English-speaking indigents are likely to learn
English on the remote chance that they will be required to go to court
to protect their liberty. Denying interpreters as a means of compelling
persons to learn English is as sensible as arguing that throwing a child
into the deep end of a pool is a means of teaching him to swim.
49. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); see Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1090.
50. Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 242, 466 P.2d 244, 258, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 34
(1970) (state interest in maintaining a single language substantial). See Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (common tongue desirable).
51. See notes 56-72 infra and accompanying text.
52. See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
53. Some members of the Supreme Court are dissatifisfied with the two-tiered
model. See Gunther, supra note 23, at 17-18. As an improvement, Professor Gunther
has suggested the "intensified means scrutiny" test. This approach, however, is not in-
tended to completely abolish the strict scrutiny test.
The intensified means scrutiny would, in short, close the wide gap between the
strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the old
not by abandoning the strict but by raising the level of the minimal from vir-
tual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.
Gunther, supra note 23, at 24.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 44.
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The state could also argue that requiring an interpreter for non-
English-speaking indigent defendants would create serious economic
and administrative problems since the court would have to hold a hear-
ing to determine the defendant's indigency and need for an interpreter
whenever there was a claim of linguistic deficiency and poverty.5" If
the claim were upheld, further proceedings would have to be postponed
until interpreters were located and appointed, and interpreters might
prove to be costly.57 But the burden to the state should not be insur-
mountable. Hearings on indigency and language deficiency, for ex-
ample, could be held and quickly disposed of before trial, thereby
eliminating any need to interrupt the trial. Moreover, interpreters
might facilitate the conduct of judicial business. Without an interpre-
ter, defendant's counsel might be forced to request recesses frequently
in order to work out communications problems with the defendant.
Indeed the Supreme Court has not found administrative and finan-
cial burdens to be determinative. It has held on equal protection
grounds that indigent defendants are entitled to appointed counsel on
their first appeal of a conviction,58 to waiver of filing fees on appeal,5"
to free trial transcripts when necessary for access to appellate review6
or when necessary to present an effective argument on appeal,"' to free
transcripts of coram nobis62 or habeas corpus63 hearings in order to ap-
peal therefrom or to prepare for a de novo hearing,64 and to a free
transcript of a preliminary hearing to prepare for trial.65 In addition,
the Court has established a right to appointed counsel at the trial court
level on due process grounds.66 In each instance, the Court has
seemed unimpressed by the interests asserted by the state. For ex-
ample, it has frustrated attempts by the states to limit the right to a
free transcript to non-frivolous appeals. 67 Perhaps the clearest display
56. See note 117 infra and accompanying text.
57. When the defendant understands only a rare language, translators might be es-
pecially expensive and difficult to locate. Such cases should occur infrequently, how-
ever, so the overall burden to the state would be slight.
58. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
59. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (appeal from habeas corpus hearing);
Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (appeal from trial).
60. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State
Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
61. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); see Gardner v. California, 393 U.S.
367 (1969) (appeal from habeas corpus); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966)
(same).
62. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
63. Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
64. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969).
65. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
66. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
67. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
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of the Court's view of the balance occurred in Mayer v. Chicago.08 In
Mayer the city argued that its fiscal and other interests outweighed the
defendant's interest in a free trial transcript for his appeal when the
only punishment facing the defendant was a fine. The Court rejected
the argument:
Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as
would be available to others able to pay their own way. The invid-
.iousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures
are made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any
differences in the sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal
interest is, therefore, irrelevant.5 9
The Court's rejection of state administrative and fiscal interests in
wealth discrimination cases indicates that such interests are unlikely to
support the denial of interpreters under the intensified means scrutiny
test. It is almost certain that state administrative and fiscal interests
do not satisfy the strict scrutiny test.70 The case for the non-English-
speaking indigent defendants is stronger than the case for the defend-
ants in the Griffin line of cases which struck down wealth barriers to
appellate review. In the Griffin line of cases, the rights of indigent
defendants to pursue a meaningful appeal were won despite the lack
of a constitutional right to appeal. 71 For the non-English-speaking de-
fendant, however, the right to a defense interpreter is essential to the
constitutional right to effective counsel. Moreover, the case for the
non-English-speaking defendant is strengthened because discrimina-
tion against such persons is substantially equivalent to national origin
discrimination, a suspect classification. 72
II
DUE PROCESS
A due process approach to the problem of a possible constitutional
(1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214
(1958).
68. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
69. Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
70. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). In Castro v. State, 2 Cal.
3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970), the state argued that providing Spanish
language ballots would involve prohibitive costs. The court, however, stated:
Avoidance or recoupment of administrative costs, while a valid state con-
cern, cannot justify imposition of an otherwise improper classification, espe-
cially when, as here, it touches on "matters close to the core of our constitu-
tional system."
Id. at 242, 466 P.2d at 257, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
71. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
72. See notes 36-46 supra and accompanying text.
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right to an interpreter affords a significant advantage over an equal pro-
tection approach. Except when appointment of counsel is involved,73 trial
courts are generally given wide discretion in determining whether in
the particular circumstances of the case the complaining party was suffi-
ciently deprived of a right to warrant relief. By contrast, the equal pro-
tection analysis focuses on the unequal imposition of burdens on differ-
ent classes, based upon evaluations of rational basis, compelling inter-
ests, or reasonableness of the classification.
A. A Right to Confrontation74
1. Current Status of the Right
A defendant's right to confront witnesses testifying against him is
guaranteed by the sixth amendment and is a fundamental element of
due process. 7 The right to confrontation includes the right to cross-
examination.7" Adequate cross-examination requires that the defend-
ant be able to understand the testimony of the witnesses and to commu-
nicate with counsel, 77 because unless the defendant can identify testi-
mony which should be challenged, his right to cross-examination is sub-
stantially impaired.
The right to confrontation has been frequently raised by defend-
ants claiming a right to a proceedings interpreter. 78  Early cases held
that the non-English-speaking defendant's right to confrontation was
not abridged even though the defendant understood neither the wit-
nesses nor his own attorney. For example, in Luera v. State,79 Zunago
73. E.g., United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 310 F. Supp. 1304
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970). See Escobar v. State, 30 Ariz. 159,
245 P. 356 (1926); Garcia v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 593, 210 S.W.2d 574 (1948);
Zunago v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 58, 138 S.W. 713 (1911); State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah
444, 121 P.2d 903 (1942); Morris, supra note 2.
74. The non-English-speaking defendant's right of confrontation has been dis-
cussed in Morris, supra note 2; Note, The Right to an Interpreter, 25 RUTGERS L. REV.
145 (1970).
75. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
76. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S.
47 (1898). Wignore said:
mhe main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the op-
ponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confron-
tation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed
upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had
except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immedi-
ate answers.
5 J. WIGMORE, EVDENCE § 1395 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original). See also Morris,
supra note 2.
77. Cf. cases cited in note 91 infra.
78. See cases cited in note 110 infra.
79. 124 Tex. Crim. 507, 63 S.W.2d 699 (1933).
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v. State,80 and Escobar v. State,"' defendants who understood only
Spanish argued that their right to confrontation was denied because
they did not comprehend the testimony of the prosecution's English-
speaking witnesses. The court in each case held that the right was
satisfied if the defendant's counsel understood English, even though he
did not speak Spanish and could not effectively act as the defendant's
agent in the cross-examination. 2
In United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, s8 however, a Court
finally recognized the possible impact of the absence of an interpreter
on a defendant's right to confrontation. Judge Bartels forcefully stated
that it was the trial court's duty .to inform the non-English-speaking de-
fendant of the availability of an interpreter. Without a proceedings in-
terpreter the defendant's right of confrontation was abridged:
In order to afford Negron his right to confrontation, it was necessary
under the circumstances that he be provided with a simultaneous
translation of what was being said for the purpose of communicating
with his attorney to enable the latter to effectively cross-examine
those English-speaking witnesses to test their credibility, their memory
and their accuracy of observation in the light of Negron's version
of the facts.84
Denial of the right to confrontation has also been found in other
situations where the defendants did not have the ability to communicate
effectively with their attorneys. In Terry v. State,85 for example, the
trial court refused an indigent deaf-mute's request for an interpreter
from the court. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the right requires not only that the defendant be able to face witnesses
against him, but also that he be provided with ,the means to understand
their testimony."
80. 63 Tex. Crim. 58, 138 S.W. 713 (1911).
81. 30 Ariz. 159, 245 P. 356 (1926).
82. Escobar v. State, 30 Ariz. 159, 169, 245 P. 356, 359 (1926); Luera v. State,
124 Tex. Crim. 507, 511-12, 63 S.W.2d 699, 701 (1933); Zunago v. State, 63 Tex. Crim.
58, 69-70, 138 S.W. 713, 719-720 (1911).
83. 310 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
84. 310 F. Supp. at 1307. The court of appeals thought that denial of an inter-
preter was "even more consequential" than the denial of the right to confrontation, on
the basis of "[c]onsiderations of fairness, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and
the potency of our adversary system of justice .... ." 434 F.2d at 389.
85. 21 Ala. App. 100, 105 So. 386 (1925).
86. The court lucidly described the right to confrontation and emphasized that it
involves more than physical confrontation.
The accused must not only be confronted by the witnesses against him, but
he must be accorded all necessary means to know and understand the testimony
given by said witnesses, and must be placed in condition where he can make
his plea, rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the transaction upon
which the accusation is based. This the fundamental law accords, and for this
the law must provide. These humane provisions must not, and cannot, be de-
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2. Analogy to Rules Relating to the Mentally Incompetent
A similar inability to communicate effectively with one's attorney
exists when the defendant is mentally incompetent. The Supreme
Court has held that when there is an indication that a defendant is men-
tally incompetent, the trial court must stop the proceedings and hold
a hearing to determine whether the defendant is mentally competent. 17
If the defendant is found to be mentally incompetent, his trial is post-
poned until he regains the ability to understand the proceedings. s8 The
test of competency is whether the defendant can communicate with his
counsel in the preparation of his defense, 9 and cases have stressed the
capacity of -the defendant to participate effectively in the defense.90
The rationale behind the refusal to try a mentally incompetent person
is not that the defendant is without knowledge of the facts of the
alleged crime; rather, it is that he is unable to communicate such know-
ledge to counsel in order to participate effectively in his own defense.9
The defendant's physical presence is not enough; legal presence re-
pendent upon the ability, financial or otherwise, of the accused, as here ap-
pears. The constitutional ight... would be meaningless and a vain and use-
less provision unless the testimony of the witnesses against him could be under-
stood by the accused. Mere confrontation of the witnesses would be useless,
bordering upon the farcical, if the accused could not hear or understand their
testimony.
21 Ala. App. at 101-02, 105 So. at 387. See also United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
192 F.2d 540, 559 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
87. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). California has a similar requirement.
People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 426 P.2d 942, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967).
88. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); People v. Beivelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60,
447 P.2d 913, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1968); People v. Laudermilk, 67 Cal. 2d 272, 431
P.2d 228, 61 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1967); People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 426 P.2d
942, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967).
89. In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) the court stated
the test as follows:
,i]t is not enough for the district judge to find "the defendant [is]
oriented to time and place and has some recollection of events," but that the
"test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his law-
yer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
Id. at 402.
90. E.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); United States
v. Horowitz, 360 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp.
972, 978 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
91. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Pouncey v. United States, 349
F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("intellectual and emotional capacity of the accused
to perform the functions which are essential to the fairness and accuracy of a criminal
proceeding"); United States v. Horowitz, 360 F. Supp. 772, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
("whether or not the mental abilities which are necessary to the construction and presen-
tation of his defense are impaired"); United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972, 978
(W.D. Mo. 1964) ("unless he can advise his counsel concerning the facts of the case
as known to him and unless, if necessary, he can testify in his own behalf . . . concern-
ing those facts").
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quires that the defendant comprehend the proceedings and be able to
communicate. 92
The situation of the non-English-speaking defendant is compar-
able to that of the mentally incompetent defendant. For example, the
non-English-speaking defendant who has only a limited ability to partic-
ipate in the cross-examination of witnesses9" may, like the mentally
incompetent defendant, 94 be incapable of participating effectively in his
own case. Although both non-English-speaking and mentally incom-
petent defendants are unable to communicate with counsel, the judicial
response to the 'two disabilities has been quite different.9 In contrast
to the requirement that the trial court hold a hearing whenever there
is an indication that the defendant is mentally incompetent, the failure
of non-English-speaking indigent defendants affirmatively to request an
interpreter often has been held to be a waiver of any right to one, de-
spite the defendant's ignorance of the availability of an interpreter. 0
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel
In Gideon v. Wainwright97 and 4rgersinger v. Hamlin,"' the
Supreme Court extended the right to appointed counsel to all proceed-
ings in which a defendant faces incarceration. The Court recognized
the importance of effective counsel in Powell v. Alabama,99 in which
it held that the failure to give defendants the time and opportunity to
secure counsel was an abridgment of -their sixth amendment right to
counsel. 100 Powell inspired a flood of post-conviction claims for relief
based on allegations of inadequate representation by counsel.191 Fear-
ful that these claims would swamp the judiciary, 11 2 courts construed
92. See cases cited note 91 supra.
93. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 310 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D.N.Y.),
alffd, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
94. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
95. Compare Cervantes v. Cox, 350 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1965); People v. Mam-
milato, 168 Cal. 207, 142 P. 58 (1914); People v. Young, 108 Cal. 8, 41 P. 281 (1895)
(defendant with limited knowledge of English found to have waived right to consel);
State v. Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942), with cases cited note 91 supra.
96. See cases cited note 110 infra and accompanying text.
97. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
98. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
99. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
100. Id. at 71.
101. E.g., Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134
(1946); Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 87 (1945).
102. The courts were also concerned with the possibility that frequent reversals for
inadequate representation would discourage lawyers from representing indigent defend-
ants. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.




Powell narrowly to require only the "effective appointment" of counsel
free from conflicts of interest and with sufficient time to prepare.103
In several oases non-English-speaking defendants were denied an
interpreter because defense counsel failed to request one. 04 Three
rationales may be advanced to support these cases. First, defense
counsel's omission might be characterized as trial strategy or tactics.10 5
Second, the defense counsers failure to request an interpreter might
be considered a waiver of the right.10 6 Third, even if failure to request
an interpreter is held to be error, it may be deemed harmless error
unless it resulted in the preclusion of a crucial defense.10 7  We contend
that all three theories have been misused.
Although courts may deny relief to a non-English-speaking
defendant whose attorney failed to request an interpreter on the
grounds that the failure to request an interpreter was a trial tactic or
strategy,"" the doctrine that an appellate court will not make post-trial
judgments with regard to defense counsers tactical decisions should not
be applied to a defense counsel's failure to assert -his client's right to
an interpreter because the absence of an interpreter can only hamper
the defense. There is no legitimate way in which requesting an inter-
preter would be detrimental to the defendant's case. 10 9
In Mitchell the court stated that an attorney should be under no public duty to rep-
resent a defendant if he could later attack the attorney's competence. Such a rationale
would seem to abrogate the duty of the attorney to represent anybody, contrary to the
Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 8C I EC 2-26 to -29 (1974).
103. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Con-
viction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289, 293-94 (1964); Waltz, discuss-
ing Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 850
(1958), argued:
The [procedural requirement] expounded in Mitchell and allied cases ignores
both the logical import and plain words of Powell. True, Mr. Justic6 Suther-
land referred to the trial judge's manifest failure, "to make an effective appoint-
ment of counsel" but he made it clear in Powell that the evil condemned was
the potential consequence: "the denial of effective and substantial aid."
Waltz, supra, at 293.
104. See cases cited note 110 infra.
105. See cases cited note 108 infra.
106. See cases cited note 110 infra.
107. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel For the Indigent Defendant, 78
HAav. L. Rv. 1434, 1435 (1965); cases cited notes 108, 118-23, infra.
108. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 312 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1963); Mitchell
v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See Duarte v. Field, 297 F. Supp.
41 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Scearce v. Field, 292 F. Supp. 807 (C.D. Cal. 1968); People v.
Miller, 7 Cal. 3d 562, 498 P.2d 1089, 102 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1972) (failure to assert de-
fense of diminished capacity characterized as a tactical choice); People v. Durham, 70
Cal. 2d 171, 192, 449 P.2d 198, 212, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262, 276, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968
(1969); People v. Goodridge, 70 Cal. 2d 824, 452 P.2d 637, 76 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1969);
cf. People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d 153, 454 P.2d 686, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1969), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972).
109. In People v. Ramos, 26 N.Y.2d 272, 258 N.E.2d 197, 309 N.Y.S.2d 906
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Even when a constitutional right to an interpreter is recognized,
appellate courts have often held that the right may be waived by failure
to request an interpreter. 10 The cases seem to turn more upon the
trial court's belief that the defendant was not seriously handicapped by
his language difficulties than upon any careful analysis of whether the
mere failure to raise the issue of language disability should constitute
waiver of -the right."' The New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Ramos,"2 held that where -there was no "obvious manifestation" of the
defendant's inability to speak English and the defense failed to assert
that the defendant could not understand English, the court had no duty
to appoint an interpreter."13 However, Ramos suggests that the court
might have the duty to appoint an interpreter sua sponte when it is clear
that the defendant does not fully comprehend English." 4
We contend that evidence of language difficulties sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's ability to understand En-
glish and communicate with counsel should mandate a 'hearing to deter-
mine whether interpreters should be appointed."15 For example, the
fact that the defendant testified through an interpreter should be
enough evidence of language disability to require a hearing, even
though it would not meet the "obvious manifestation" standard of
(1970), the court held that where defendant's counsel fails to request an interpreter it
cannot later be claimed defendant was denied due process by the absence of an inter-
preter.
Otherwise, it would be possible for a defendant to remain silent throughout the
trial, and take a chance of a favorable verdict-failing in which, he could se-
cure a new trial upon the ground that he did not understand the language in
which the testimony was given.
Id. 275, 258 N.E.2d at 198, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 908 (1970).
110. Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1962); Gonzales v. Vir-
gin Islands, 109 F.2d 215, 217 (3d Cir. 1940); People v. Estany, 210 Cal. App. 2d 609,
611, 26 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 (2d Dist. 1962); People v. Von Mullendorf, 110 Cal. App.
2d 286, 289, 242 P.2d 403, 405 (2d Dist. 1952); People v. Ramos, 26 N.Y.2d 274, 258
N.E.2d 197, 309 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1970); People v. Hernandez, 8 N.Y.2d 345, 348, 170
N.E.2d 673, 675, 207 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 976 (1961);
Salas v. State, 385 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
111. ee cases cited note 110 supra.
112. 26 N.Y.2d 272, 258 N.E.2d 197, 309 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1970).
113. See id. at 275, 258 N.E.2d at 198, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
114. Id. The language in Ramos suggests that if the court has the duty to act sua
sponte and appoint an interpreter whenever it is obviouis that the defendant does not
understand English, the defendant's failure to raise the issue of an interpreter would not
constitute waiver of the right. The burden on the court is the same as that imposed
on the federal courts in mental incompetency cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
115. Cf. cases cited notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text. Although there is no
direct support for requiring an evidentary hearing to determine language ability, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that whenever a trial court is aware that there may
be a significant language difficulty the court should conduct a formal examination of
the need for an interpreter. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1973)
(per curiam).
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Ramos." If the trial court does not hold a hearing when the evidence
before it is sufficient to compel one, the appellate court should remand
for a hearing. The trial court decision should be reversed if it is deter-
mined on remand that the defendant did not speak English well enough
to understand his trial and assist in -his defense. A hearing to deter-
mine the defendant's ability to speak and understand English need not
be elaborate. Normally the court should be able to decide whether
interpreters are necessary by questioning and observing the defend-
ant.1 17 Especially when fraud is suspected, however, other testimony
may be necessary to establish the extent of defendant's ability to under-
stand and communicate in English. Although the question of a partic-
ular defendant's need for an interpreter falls largely within the trial
judge's discretion, the court should not consider the scarcity or cost of
competent translators.
In People v. Ibarra,1" 8 the California Supreme Court used a harm-
less error standard in holding that the defendant was denied the right
to effective counsel where counsel's failure -to prepare foreclosed the
presentation of a crucial defense."19 The harmless error principle re-
quires that the defendant show as a matter of "demonstrable reality"
that the errors alleged prejudiced the outcome of the -trial.120  The er-
ror must be discernible from the record' 2' and be of such magnitude
as to render the trial -a "farce or sham."' 22  Even constitutional errors
do not automatically call for reversal. 23
When the error alleged is a specific omission on the part of coun-
sel the harmless error doctrine may be appropriate since an appellate
court can -assess the impact of a single error with reasonable ease. In
116. 26 N.Y.2d at 275, 258 N.E.2d at 198, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
117. Procedures for determining English proficiency are discussed in Note, The
Right to an hiterpreter, 25 RuTGERS L. Rlv. 145 (1970).
118. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
119. Id. at 464, 386 P.2d at 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 866. See also Scalf v. Bennett,
408 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1969) ("only when the trial was a farce, or a mockery or justice,
or was shocking to the conscience of the reversing court, or the purported representation
was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham pretence or without adequate opportunity for
conference and preparation"); Maye v. Pescor, 162 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1947) ("ex-
treme case"); Scearce v. Field, 292 F. Supp. 807 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (defendant failed
to show that counsel was incompetent as a matter of "demonstrable reality"); People
v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
972 (1972); People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 449 P.2d 198, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262, cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969); People v. Massie, 66 Cal. 2d 899, 428 P.2d 869, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 733 (1967); People v. Reeves, 64 Cal. 2d 766, 774, 415 P.2d 35, 39, 51 Cal. Rptr.
691, 695 (1966).
120. People v. Reeves, 64 Cal. 2d 766, 774, 415 P.2d 35, 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 691,
695 (1966).
121. id.
122. Scalf v. Bennett, 408 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1969).
123. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
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the case of the non-English-speaking defendant, however, the language
defect pervades the entire proceeding. Not only is it difficult for the
defendant, his attorney, and the appeals court to isolate discrete errors
due to miscommunication, but there is a high probability that undetect-
able errors and misunderstanding will profoundly affect the outcome.
Because the potential for harm is great and the identification of specific
instances of prejudicial harm may be impossible, courts should use a
per se rather than a harmless error standard. When a needed inter-
preter has been absent at the trial court level, the appellate court should
presume that prejudicial error has resulted and should order that the
non-English-speaking defendant be granted a new trial with a defense
interpreter. Unfortunately, appeals by a non-English-speaking defen-
dant on the ground that his language banier constituted a denial of
assistance of counsel are rarely successful. 121 Thus, we are confronted
with the -absurdity of a system which grants an attorney to the indigent




Voters and their legislators have proved somewhat more sensitive
to defendant's language problems than courts. 125 California voters re-
cently granted defendants who need interpreters a state constitutional
right to an interpreter throughout court proceedings. 26 Though few
states give defendants a statutory right to an interpreter, 27 legislation
pending in the United States Senate proposes that in federal judicial
districts where five percent or fifty thousand of the residents, whichever
is less, do not "speak or understand the English language with reason-
able facility," the court must provide interpreters to indigent defend-
ants and make interpreters available to non-indigent defendants at
fixed rates. 28  In addition, when interpreters are used the proceedings
124. See cases cited note 110 supra.
125. In addition to S. 1794 in the U.S. Senate and the approval of Proposition 7
by the people of California which provide interpreters for non-English speaking defend-
ants, the California legislature has passed a bill to protect Spanish-speaking consumers.
This provision would require certain business contracts and agreements to be translated
into Spanish upon the request of the purchaser. Law of September 26, 1974, ch. 1446,
Section 1, to go into effect July 1, 1976, as CAL. CVIL CODE § 1632.
126. "A person unable to understand English who is charged with a crime has a
right to an interpreter throughout the proceedings." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14. The
words "throughout the proceedings" imply that non-English speaking indigent defendants
have the right to a defense interpreter.
127. See note 9 supra.
128. S. 1724, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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must be recorded verbatim so the transcript or recording will reflect
the original language.' 29
This long overdue interest in the problems of non-English-
speaking indigent defendants, however, is not sufficiently responsive.
For example, the federal legislation provides relief only where there
are large concentrations of non-English-speaking persons, which means
that the right to an interpreter depends on how many non-English-
speaking neighbors a person has, 3° or in the judicial district in which
a defendant is brought to trial. Furthermore, the proposed federal leg-
islation fails to specify how to determine what percentage of the resi-
dents of a judicial district do not speak English with "reasonable
facility." The "reasonable facility" standard itself gives little guidance
as to what level of English competence is determinative. This vague
and subjective standard is likely to render the results of any survey sus-
pect.
Another problem with the proposed federal legislation is that it
fails to provide relief for non-English-speaking defendants in state
courts. The federal legislation also does not indicate whether a defen-
dant has a right to an interpreter at all stages of the proceedings. Since
most criminal cases are plea-bargained and never reach trial, the failure




Whether the courts or the legislature ultimately provide relief to
the defendant disabled by inability to the speak English, the importance
of a separate defense interpreter cannot be overstressed. While courts
may wish to limit costs by appointing a single interpreter to translate
both the court proceedings and the discussions between defendant and
counsel, the use of a single translator for both purposes may prove in-
adequate. First, it is nearly impossible for one interpreter to translate
the testimony of a witness while simultaneously translating and listening
to the discussions between defendant and counsel. It is in these cir-
129. S. 1724, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1827 (1973).
130. The federal rule is particularly problematic when applied to a district such as
San Francisco, where more than five percent of the population speaks myriad languages.
131. Over 85 percent of convictions in the federal district courts are the result of
guilty pleas or pleas of nolo contendere, many of which are the result of plea bargaining.
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463 & n.7 (1969). See Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); White, A
Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. Rav. 439 (1971);
Comment, Judicial Supervision over California Plea Bargaining: Regulating the Trade,
59 CALIF. L. RaV. 962 (1971).
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cumstances that a defense interpreter is most needed to ensure ade-
quate representation by the defendant's counsel. Second, it is difficult
for an interpreter who has worked closely with the defendant and his
counsel in the preparation of the defense from the pretrial stage to
translate the court proceedings impartially.13 2  Finally, a separate de-
fense interpreter would serve to ensure the accuracy of the proceed-
ings and witness interpreters. 33
An alternative to the defense interpreter is the bilingual attorney,
who speaks the defendant's language as well as English. 114 Appoint-
ment of bilingual counsel does not abrogate the need for a proceedings
interpreter, however, since without the proceedings interpreter, the bi-
lingual attorney is in the undesirable position of translating the pro-
ceedings to the defendant while at the same time attempting to formu-
late and discuss strategy and tactics. Even if a bilingual attorney were
available, it is unclear whether a defendant would have a right to
his services. The California Supreme Court in Drumgo v. Superior
Court,' ,35 held that an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional
right 'to appointment of the attorney of -his choice so long as the court's
choice is not an abuse of discretion. But where a competent, bilingual
132. Since the interpreter is privy to attorney-client communications, his knowledge
is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1252 (1942); Annot.,
53 A.L.R. 370 (1927).
133. See generally Lujan v. United States, 209 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1953). In
Lujan the defendant objected to the use of a witness interpreter who was related to the
witness. The trial court's overruling of the objection was sustained on appeal because
the defendant had his own interpreter who could assess the accuracy the witness inter-
preter. See United States v. Guerra, 334 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1964); People v. Mendes,
35 Cal. 2d 537, 219 P.2d 1 (1950).
134. The Civil Rights Commission has discovered, however, that public defender
offices in communities which have a large number of non-English-speaking people are
ill-equipped to deal with language problems:
The public defender for Los Angeles County stated that he was authorized
235 lawyers, but could only think of one Spanish-surnamed lawyer and a dozen
Spanish-speaking lawyers who were employed by his office. . . . An attorney
in Phoenix was critical of the public defender's office in his community be-
cause it did not have any Mexican American attorneys on its staff, nor any
attorneys who could speak or understand Spanish. . . A similar situation
was said to exist in the public defender's office in Denver. At the time the
director was interviewed by a Commission staff member, nine lawyers, three
investigators, and four clerical workers were on his staff. None of the attor-
neys was Mexican American and none spoke Spanish.
U.S. CoMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, MExIcAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUs-
TricE IN TiE SouTWEsr- 69 (1970). Lacking Spanish-speaking attorneys, these public
defender offices were forced to rely on bilingual clerks or secretaries. The quality of
such translation was frequently low. Id. at 69. In Los Angeles, "When a defendant
represented by [the public defender's office] is in custody the non-Spanish-speaking at-
torneys use a trustee [another prisoner] at the jail to interpret during interviews and
trial preparation." Id.
135. 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1973), noted in 62 CALIF.
L. Rav. 512, 519 (1974).
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attorney is available for appointment, the court's refusal to appoint him
to represent a non-English-speaking indigent may constitute abuse of
discretion, particularly if interpreters are not subsequently appointed
to aid counsel.
CONCLUSION
Courts have displayed an unwarranted insensitivity to the plight
of non-English-speaking defendants. The criminal process is particu-
larly terrifying to the defendant who, because of an inability to speak
English, is unable to communicate with the court or his counsel and
unable to understand the testimony presented against him. Moreover,
without the aid of an interpreter, the probability of error prejudicial
to 'the defendant is great and the likelihood of the detection of such
error low.
The attack on this problem must be two-fold. The courts should
establish that non-English-speaking defendants have a constitutional
right to an interpreter. The fundamental guarantees of due process,
in the form of the rights to confrontation and counsel are sufficient
grounds on which to base such a right. In the absence of judicial ac-
tion, the legislatures must enact provisions guaranteeing interpreters for
non-English-speaking defendants. They must provide a procedure
which will compel the trial court to institute an evidentiary hearing
whenever a reasonable doubt arises as to a defendant's ability to com-
prehend and communicate in English.
The quality of justice a defefndant receives should not depend on
his ability or inability to speak English especially when his linguistic
facility may be beyond his control. Other countries have increasingly
recognized the necessity of interpreters in a time of expanding inter-
national trade and travel to ensure the fairness of their judicial pro-
cesses. 136 This country must do the same.
136. See, e.g., CoDE ART. 175 (Japan); CODE ART. 48, 1952 Y.B. 46 (Czech.);
CODE ART. 180 (Korea); CODE ART. 5 (Yugo.); AcT ART. 6, 1954 Y.B. 135 (Hung.),
all cited in Foote, Problems of the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Law and
Procedure, 84-87 & nn.432-35 (Feb. 17, 1958) (unpublished paper presented to the
United Nations Seminar on the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, Manila, Philippines, 1958).
To say that the deaf man or the foreigner who does not understand the
language of the proceedings has not the inherent right to have them made intel-
ligible to him is to say that the privilege of being present during his trial and
the privilege of hearing and cross-examining the witnesses against him was a
mere form and that the common law was satisfied to have the letter of its re-
quirement complied with while its spirit and substance went unfulfilled.
The King v. Silvester, 1912 1 K.B. 337, 339 (Can.). See also M. MosKowrlz, HUMAN
RiGTos AND WORLD ORDER (1958).
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